Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Osgoode Digital Commons
Articles & Book Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2011

The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment
John D. McCamus
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, jmccamus@osgoode.yorku.ca

Source Publication:
Canadian Bar Review. Volume 90, Number 2 (2011), p. 439-467.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works

Recommended Citation
McCamus, John D. "The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment." Canadian Bar Review
90.2 (2011): 439-467.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of Osgoode Digital
Commons.

THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
John D McCamus*
Alone among the great restatements of the common law published by the
American Law Institute in the 1930s and 1940s, the 1937 Restatement of
Restitution boldly asserted the existence of a new third branch of the
common law of obligations to stand alongside contract and tort. The
organizing thesis of the Restatement was that hitherto ignored bodies of
common law, known then as the law of quasi-contract, and of equity,
centring on the use of the constructive trust, could be unified and
restated as a coherent legal subject resting on an underlying principle
against unjust enrichment. The new Restatement (Third), of Restitution
and Unjust Enrichment builds on the foundation of the 1937
Restatement and offers an up-to-date account of American law on this
subject which is equivalent both in its essentials and in most of its details
to the restitutionary law of the Canadian common law provinces. The
Restatement (Third) follows the basic analytical structure of the subject
adopted in 1937 in terms of the scope of the subject, and the relationship
between the underlying general principle and the detailed substantive
liability rules. The Restatement (Third) includes modernized and
integrated treatments of restitutionary remedies and defences.
Throughout, it achieves a more effective integration of common law and
equitable doctrines than was accomplished by its 1937 predecessor.
Seule parmi les principales « reformulations » de la common law publiée
par l’American Law Institute durant les années 30 et 40, le « 1937
Restatement of Restitution » a soutenu audacieusement l’existence d’un
troisième volet du droit des obligations relevant de la common law et se
rapportant aux contrats et aux délits. La thèse de cette reformulation
soulignait que les sujets ignorés jusqu’à cette époque, connus alors sous
les expressions de « quasi-contrat » et d’« equity », centrés sur l’usage
de la fiducie par interprétation, pourraient être fusionnés et reformulés
en un sujet cohérent de droit portant sur le principe sous-jacent contre
l’enrichissement injustifié. La plus récente reformulation intitulée
« Restatement (Third), of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment » s’appuie
sur le fondement du « 1937 Restatement of Restitution » tout en offrant
un compte- rendu à jour du droit américain sur ce sujet lequel équivaut,
à la fois dans ses grandes lignes et dans plusieurs de ses détails, au droit
relatif à la restitution dans les provinces de common law au Canada.
*
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Cette récente reformulation du droit suit la composition analytique du
sujet adopté par la version de 1937 en ce qui concerne la portée du sujet
et la relation entre les principes généraux du droit et les règlements de
fond portant sur la responsabilité. L’ouvrage « Restatement (Third) »
contient des analyses modernes et intégrées de solutions de restitution et
de moyens de défense. Dans l’ensemble, le texte réussit à intégrer la
common law et les doctrines en equity avec une plus grande efficacité
que la version antérieure de 1937.
1. Introduction
Publication by the American Law Institute of the new Restatement of
Restitution under the title, Restatement of the Law Third, Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment (R3RUE)1 is an event of great significance for the
private law jurisprudence of the common law countries, as was the case
with its predecessor, the 1937 Restatement of Restitution: Quasi-Contracts
and Constructive Trust.2 The new Restatement is very likely to have a
profound influence on the continued evolution and study of restitutionary
doctrine, that large body of jurisprudence now generally considered within
the common law world to constitute a third branch of the private law of
obligations, in addition to contract and tort. The purpose of this article is to
provide the reader with an overview of the structure and contents of the
new Restatement and to highlight some of the innovations and strengths of
R3RUE.
2. The Restatements of Restitution: A Brief History
The American Law Institute was established in 1923 under the leadership
of a prominent group of judges, lawyers and legal academics of the day.3
The Institute was created in response to a professional concern that the
jurisprudence of the States of the Union was not only dramatically
increasing in volume but, as well, in its diversity, thereby jeopardizing
uniformity or consistency in American law across state boundaries. The
method chosen by the Institute to address this problem was that of
producing “an orderly restatement of the law,” authoritative but unofficial
summaries of the substance of American jurisprudence in various subject
areas or branches of the law.4 Shortly thereafter, the Institute developed a
plan for writing these Restatements of American law by appointing
1

(St Paul, Minn: American Law Institute Publishers, 2011) [R3RUE].
(St Paul, Minn: American Law Institute Publishers, 1937).
3
See John P Frank, “The American Law Institute, 1923 – 1998” (1998) 26
Hofstra L Rev 615.
4
Ibid at 616.
2
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“Reporters,” who were typically leading academics in the field of law to
be restated and, to support their work, panels of “Advisers” drawn from all
three branches of the profession. The Restatements were to be drawn up in
the form of propositions of law accompanied by explanatory commentary
and a series of illustrations drawn from the reported case law. Although the
Restatements were intended to be exercises in restating the existing law, it
was initially conceived that, as well, the Restatements could “promote
those changes which will tend better to adapt the law to the needs of life”5
providing that such modification should be restricted to those that are
“generally accepted as desirable.”6 Nonetheless, the predominating
objective of the Restatements was restatement rather than reform of the
existing law and it is on this basis, presumably, that the Restatements have
generally enjoyed recognition in the United States as authoritative
expositions of the existing law. They are frequently cited with approval in
American jurisprudence.
The first series of Restatements appeared throughout the 1930s and
1940s and included such well known restatements as those on Contract in
1932, Conflicts in 1934, Trusts in 1935, Torts in 1939, and Property in
1944. Alone among the first series of first Restatements, however, the 1937
Restatement of Restitution essentially invented a new subject of the law by
drawing together two large but not very well understood bodies of legal
doctrine, the common law doctrines then usually referred to as the law of
“quasi-contract” and various equitable doctrines including but not limited
to the various strands of authority leading to the imposition of a
constructive trust. The basic animating idea of this Restatement was that
these two bodies of doctrine had languished in obscurity at the margins of
contract and trust. Quasi-contract had been misdescribed and misunderstood
as a body rules resting on “implied” contracts of some kind and received
scant treatment, if any, in the treatises on contract law. Doctrines relating
to the constructive trust were similarly obscured by a false connection with
the law of express trusts on the basis that although not express, they were
nonetheless real or “implied” trusts in some sense.
The basic organizing principle or thesis of the Restatement of
Restitution, then, was to pry quasi-contracts and constructive trusts away
from their false and misleading homes in contract and trust and integrate
them into a new branch of the law resting on an underlying principle
against unjust enrichment. Quasi-contracts were not implied-in-fact
contracts but rather obligations imposed by law to prevent unjust
enrichment. The constructive trust was not a substantive trust but merely a
remedy imposed to prevent unjust enrichment. Thus, the first section of the
5
6

Ibid at 617.
Ibid at 618.
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1937 Restatement famously articulated the underlying principle in the
following terms:
A person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make
restitution to the other.7

In the pages that follow, the Restatement’s Co-Reporters, Harvard professors
Warren A Seavey and Austin W Scott set out Seavey’s restatement of the law
of quasi-contract (in Part I) and Scott’s restatement of the law relating to
constructive trusts and “Analogous Equitable Remedies” (in Part II).
Although the Restatement thus brought together, within the confines of a
single Restatement, the common law and equitable doctrines restated
therein, they were not in any other sense integrated in the account of the
existing law provided in the 1937 Restatement.
The basic idea of grounding the law of both quasi-contract and
constructive trust on the basis of a principle against unjust enrichment was
neither original to the Institute nor to its Co-Reporters. Indeed, the Institute
had initially determined to include a chapter on constructive trusts in the
Restatement of Trusts, to be written by Austin W Scott as its Reporter and
to include a separate “Restatement of Quasi-Contracts” within this first
series of restatements.8 The problematic nature of the conceptual
foundations of both quasi-contract and constructive trust and the potential
fruitfulness of unjust enrichment as an explanatory ground had, however,
been mooted in the law reviews by two other Harvard luminaries, James
Barr Ames9 and Roscoe Pound.10 Under the influence of these ideas, the
Institute changed course in the early 1930s and determined to include in
the restatement program a restatement of quasi-contract and constructive
trusts, tentatively to be titled the “Restatement of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment.”11 The new Restatement, with its title perhaps unfortunately
revised to a simple “Restatement of Restitution,” was published in 1937.
This invention of a new branch of the law was apparently readily
accepted by the profession as legitimate and, in the years following its
publication, the Restatement of Restitution enjoyed increasing influence as
7

Supra note 2 at 12.
See Andrew Kull, “Three Restatements of Restitution” (2011) 68 Wash & Lee
L Rev 867 at 868-69 [Kull, “Three Restatements”].
9
James Barr Ames, “The History of Assumpsit” (1888) 2 Harv L Rev 53. For an
account of the early history of the development of the conceptual framework of
restitution, see Andrew Kull, “James Barr Ames and the Early Modern History of Unjust
Enrichment” (2005) 25 Oxford J Legal Stud 297.
10
Roscoe Pound, “The Progress of the Law in 1918-1919: Equity” (1920) 33
Harv L Rev 420.
11
(1934) 11 American Law Institute Proceedings 335.
8
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an authoritative restatement of the doctrines of quasi-contract and
constructive trust, often being referred to in judicial opinions dealing with
these matters. In due course, these ideas migrated to the other major
common law jurisdictions and treatises on the law of “restitution” began to
appear in the later part of the twentieth century in England, Canada,12
Australia and New Zealand.
Notwithstanding the remarkable success of “restitution” as an idea, the
Institute ultimately decided not to include Restitution in the second series
of revised restatements it produced in the 1960s and 1970s. There is no
Restatement Second of Restitution. The story behind this surprising
omission is told elsewhere.13 In brief, the Institute did make a start on a
Restatement Second of Restitution and the first few Tentative Drafts were
prepared and circulated for review at annual meetings of the Institute in
1983 and 1984. Those drafts tackled complex areas of the law of restitution
in a fashion that proved to be controversial to members of the Institute. In
due course, work was suspended on the Restatement Second of Restitution
and, for a time, it appeared that the Institute might attempt to fold
restitution into a new “Restatement of Remedies.” The fact that
“Remedies” as a subject, including restitutionary remedies, had emerged in
the curricula of many law schools and, indeed, in state bar exams, may
have appeared to legitimate a move in this direction. Those who preferred
a revival of the Restatement Second of Restitution pressed the Institute with
the argument that “Restitution” was not simply another type of “remedy”
but that it constituted a body of substantive doctrine creating sources of
civil liability other than contract and tort that gave rise to the remedy of
restitution.
After a period of internal deliberations and uncertainty as to the proper
course to take, the Institute eventually decided in 1996 that it would return
to the project of a new Restatement of Restitution.14 Preliminary work on
the project began in 1996. In 1997, the Institute appointed Andrew Kull,
then of Emory University, later to move to the Boston University School
12
Although the reorganization of a body of doctrine into a branch of the law
would not normally be thought to require a judicial imprimatur – where are the
authorities approving the invention of contracts and torts in the nineteenth century? – it
is of no little interest that the Supreme Court of Canada explicitly embraced the unjust
enrichment thesis and the remedial theory of the constructive trust in a remarkable series
of cases beginning in 1954. For a brief account see John D McCamus, “Forty Years of
Restitution: A Retrospective” (2011) 50 Can Bus LJ 474.
13
See Kull, “Three Restatements,” supra note 8 at 873-76.
14
Professor Laycock was a prominent advocate of this position in the internal
discussions. See Douglas Laycock, “The Scope and Significance of Restitution” (1989)
67 Tex L Rev 1277. See also Kull, “Three Restatements,” supra note 8 at 876-80.
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of Law, as a Reporter, together with a group of Advisers to work on the
new Restatement of Restitution. By this point in time, the Institute was well
underway in its third series of Restatements, so the new Restatement of
Restitution was to be called the “Restatement Third of Restitution.”
Meetings of the Advisory Committee to review Preliminary Drafts and
Tentative Drafts began in 199915 and continued into the fall of 2010. The
final Council Draft was approved on May 12, 2010 and the final edited
version of the entire Restatement, now renamed the Restatement Third of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, was published by the Institute
approximately a year later. From beginning to end, the entire process of
creating R3RUE occupied fifteen years. For those who view the famous
decision of Lord Mansfield in Moses v Macferlan16 as the fons et origo of
the modern unjust enrichment approach to restitutionary liability, the fact
that May 12, 2010, the date on which the Institute approved the final
Council Draft, is precisely the 250th anniversary of that decision – to the
day – will no doubt cause a pleasurable frisson of historical connectedness.
3. Scope and Structure of R3RUE
The scope of the final subject matter covered by R3RUE continues, in its
essential respects, the model developed for the new branch of the law
described in the 1937 Restatement. Thus, R3RUE restates the common law
rules arising from the common law once referred to as quasi-contract on
such topics as moneys paid by mistake, under duress, pursuant to
transactions rendered ineffective by various doctrines of common law, the
recovery of benefits acquired through tortious wrongdoing or conferred
under an emergency, and so on. From the equity side of the ledger are
drawn doctrines relating to the conferral of other benefits by mistake,
under undue influence, through crime or breach of fiduciary duty or breach
of confidence and under transactions ineffective for equitable reasons such
as unconscionability and mistake. The constructive trust is treated as one
of the possible remedies to prevent unjust enrichment and is therefore not
restricted, as it is in English law, essentially to fiduciary relations.
As the authors of the 1937 Restatement were well aware, this
collection of common law and equitable doctrines imposes what might be
referred to as “benefit-based” liability of two kinds. The first type, of
which the recovery of moneys mistakenly paid by the plaintiff to the
15
I should disclose that I had the privilege of serving on the panel of Advisers for
R3RUE. As I was to learn, however, the role of the Advisers is simply to meet and review
drafts, offering helpful, if often conflicting, advice (no votes are taken) to the Reporter.
The Reporter may or may not take some or all of the advice. R3RUE is, therefore, very
much an exercise in authorship by the Reporter.
16
(1760), 2 Burr 1005, 97 ER 676 [Moses].
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defendant would be a simple illustration, involves the recovery of a benefit
transferred by the plaintiff to the defendant. Where the case involves a
mistaken transfer of money, for example, one can comfortably describe the
restitutionary remedy as requiring the plaintiff to “give back” or “restore”
an equivalent amount of money to the plaintiff. The language of giving
back does not work as well with situations where the plaintiff has
conferred services upon the defendant or in circumstances where the
plaintiff has conferred value on the defendant by paying money to a third
party which has the effect, say, of relieving the defendant of a tax liability.
Nonetheless, the basic idea is a simple one. In this type of case, a benefit
enjoyed by the defendant corresponds to an observable loss on the part of
the plaintiff.
The second type of benefit may arise, for example, in the context of
breach of fiduciary obligation. This type consists of benefits acquired not
from the plaintiff directly but from third parties by means of a breach of a
duty owed to the plaintiff. A fiduciary might abuse a duty owed to the
plaintiff by engaging in profitable dealings with third parties. These profits
are recoverable by the plaintiff. In recent decades, this particular type of
benefit-based liability has been referred to by some as relief in the
“disgorgement” measure. It is a form of relief that is available to a plaintiff
who is, in some sense, the victim of wrongful conduct on the part of the
defendant. Thus, a fiduciary in breach of a fiduciary obligation owed to the
plaintiff will be liable to disgorge all profits secured through that wrongful
conduct, in order to prevent, as R3RUE would say, the fiduciary’s unjust
enrichment.
Three points should be noted with respect to these two forms or
measures of restitutionary liability. First, neither measure is the exclusive
preserve of either the old common law of quasi-contract or equitable
doctrines like constructive trust. Thus, disgorgement relief for breach of
fiduciary duty and breach of confidence is historically equitable in nature.
Disgorgement of benefits secured through tortious wrongdoing, however,
derives from the old common law of quasi-contract.
Second, the two measures are overlapping in the sense that there are
some types of restitutionary claims in which both measures of relief may
be available. In a fiduciary duty case, for example, the fiduciary may, in
breach of duty, acquire assets from the plaintiff to whom the duty is owed.
The plaintiff may seek literal restitution of the benefit that the plaintiff has
transferred directly to the defendant through a decree of rescission. On the
other hand, there are of course cases, noted above, in which the defendant
fiduciary acquires benefits in breach of a fiduciary duty through dealings
with third parties. Such profits, whether or not they could have in fact been
enjoyed by the plaintiff in the absence of a breach of duty, are recoverable
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in a disgorgement claim. Moreover, as the common law is dynamic and
capable of change, it is noteworthy that the types of claims that historically
gave rise only to benefit-based claims in the first sense may come to be
recognized as capable of providing a basis for disgorgement relief. Thus,
in recent years, we have learned that restitutionary liability for breach of
contract may include not only restoration of benefits transferred by the
plaintiff to the defendant but also the disgorgement of profits secured
through a wrongful breach of contract.17
Third, the 1937 Restatement and R3RUE are structured on the basis of
an assumption that both types of benefit-based liability – direct transfer
and disgorgement – can be said to be grounded on the basis of the unjust
enrichment principle to the effect that a person “who is unjustly enriched
at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution.” It is not
immediately obvious, however, how a disgorgement claim in
circumstances where the plaintiff could not have enjoyed the profits in
question can be described as involving a situation which the benefit has
been acquired “at the expense of another.”18 R3RUE deals with this
question head on in the opening paragraph of its discussion of section 1 in
the following terms:
Liability in restitution derives from the receipt of a benefit whose retention without
payment would result in the unjust enrichment of the defendant at the expense of the
claimant. While the paradigm case of unjust enrichment is one in which the benefit on
one side of the transaction corresponds to an observable loss on the other, the
consecrated formula ‘at the expense of another’ can also mean ‘in violation of the
other’s legally protected rights,’ without the need to show that the claimant has
suffered a loss.19

Cross reference is then made to section 3 of R3RUE which states the
general principle underlying the disgorgement remedies in the following
terms:
A person is not permitted to profit by his own wrong.20

17
Attorney General v Blake, [2001] UKHL 45, [2001] 1 AC 268, for discussion
of which see Peter D Maddaugh and John D McCamus, The Law of Restitution, looseleaf
(Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2011) c 25.
18
Seavey and Scott, in an article introducing the 1937 Restatement to an English
audience, acknowledged the difficulty but suggested that in such instances the emphasis
shifts from “restitution” to “unjust enrichment” inasmuch as the plaintiff is able to
recover more than he or she lost; see Warren A Seavey and Austin W Scott, “Restitution”
(1938) 54 Law Q Rev 29 at 37.
19
R3RUE, supra note 1, vol 1 at 3.
20
Ibid at 22.
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The Commentary to section 3 goes on to caution, however, that “[t]he
statement of this Section identifies an outlook and an objective, not a cause
of action. Working rules that authorize a claim to restitution of wrongful
gain appear in other sections of this Restatement, describing more
precisely the nature of the wrongdoing in a particular case.”21 Cross
reference is then made to sections dealing with such matters as fraud,
duress, undue influence, breach of contract, profitable tort and other forms
of wrongful activity.
For Canadian readers, it is useful to emphasize the manner in which
the unjust enrichment principle is interpreted by the Restatements, so as to
include both benefits directly transferred from plaintiff to defendant and
disgorgement for benefits acquired through wrongdoing, as there is some
risk that Canadian lawyers will, as a result of an influential obiter dictum
in Pettkus v Becker 22 – in which Dickson J stated the unjust enrichment
principle in terms requiring both “benefit” to the defendant and
“corresponding deprivation” to the plaintiff – will not appreciate the scope
or breadth of restitutionary doctrine. To some at least, the reference to
“corresponding deprivation” may create even greater difficulty in
connecting the unjust enrichment principle to liability rules involving
disgorgement of profits obtained by wrongdoing. Some Canadian lawyers
and judges have mistakenly concluded that, because of the language of
“corresponding derivation,” there can be no unjust enrichment or
restitutionary liability in the absence of an observable and corresponding
loss having been suffered by the plaintiff. To give this effect or
interpretation to the language of Dickson J in Pettkus would, in my view,
be a grave error. Surely, there was no intention on the part of Dickson J to
simply overrule or abolish the existing black-letter rules that permit
restitutionary recovery in cases not involving corresponding loss in that
sense. Peter Maddaugh and I have suggested elsewhere23 that in order to
preserve the integrity and unity of restitution as a third branch of the law,
the best interpretation of Dickson J’s language of “corresponding
deprivation” is that it should be considered to include, in the manner of
R3RUE, situations where a benefit has been acquired “‘in violation of the
other’s legally protected rights’ without the need to show that the claimant
has suffered a loss.”24 Thus, in a fiduciary duty disgorgement case, the
“corresponding deprivation” suffered by the plaintiff is that his rights as
the beneficiary of the fiduciary obligation have been violated, whether or
not an economic loss to the plaintiff has been sustained.

21
22
23
24

Ibid.
[1980] 2 SCR 834, 117 DLR (3d) 257 [Pettkus].
Maddaugh and McCamus, supra note 17 at 3-21 to 3-24.
R3RUE, supra note 1, vol 1 at 3.
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To the extent that misunderstanding or disagreement on the question
of the scope of the unjust enrichment principle, and the correct
interpretation of “at the expense of” or “corresponding deprivation” may
persist, it is important to note that this is a disagreement about how to
define terms and how broadly to conceive the subject matter of
“restitution” or “unjust enrichment” rather than a dispute about how actual
cases have been or should be decided. That is to say, the American and
Commonwealth authorities allowing disgorgement remedies in the
absence of corresponding economic loss are well established, and for good
reason. It would be most unfortunate if confusion about terminology were
to lead Canadian lawyers and judges to conclude that old and well
established forms of liability have simply vanished from the fabric of the
common law. There are, however, some scholars, in particular, the late
Peter Birks and some of his followers, who favour a narrow interpretation
of the concept of unjust enrichment that would exclude disgorgement for
wrongful conduct. They do not propose that such cases would be
considered to be overruled. It is their view that what is required is a
separate fourth branch of the law to accommodate such cases.25 My own
view, however, is that a broader conception of the subject as initially
conceived in the 1937 Restatement and as continued in R3RUE, embracing
both forms of benefit-based liability creates a third branch of the law which
is not only more comprehensive but more coherent, given the overlapping
nature of the two forms of relief.
It is also important to note that this apparent awkwardness with the
expression “at the expense of” is not exclusive to true disgorgement as
opposed to direct transfer cases. Thus, where, as a result of fraudulent
inducements, the plaintiff transferred property to the defendant, the
plaintiff is entitled to rescission in restitution even if the transfer was
effected at fair market value such that no economic loss was sustained by
the plaintiff.26 Similarly, where a fiduciary acquires property at the fair
market value from a plaintiff through a breach of the fiduciary duty owed
to the plaintiff, the plaintiff can seek rescission of the transaction or subject
the defendant to a constructive trust, notwithstanding the absence of a
“corresponding loss” by the plaintiff.27 Consistently with this proposition,
if the defendant, in breach of a fiduciary obligation owed to the plaintiff
acquires property from a third party, that property will typically be
subjected to a constructive trust in the plaintiff’s favour, regardless of

25

Peter BH Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005) [Birks, Unjust Enrichment].
26
For a series of illustrations of the point, see R3RUE, supra note 1, vol 1 at 16970.
27
See, generally, Maddaugh and McCamus, supra note 17 at 27-34 to 27-35.
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whether the defendant acquired the property at a bargain price.28
Unfortunately, in Soulos v Korkontzilas,29 the Supreme Court of Canada
lost sight of this proposition and wrote a decision holding that such a case
does not constitute “unjust enrichment.” The Court seems to have been led
astray by the “corresponding deprivation” language from Pettkus, with
much resulting confusion in later cases.
Finally, as noted above, the 1937 Restatement stitched together between
the covers of one volume what are essentially free-standing accounts of the
law of quasi-contract, on the one hand, and, on the other, the law of equity
relating to the constructive trust and other equitable remedies, without
otherwise attempting an integration of these two bodies of doctrine. Thus,
for example, the common law rules relating to the recovery of benefits
transferred by mistake are set out in Part II on quasi-contract and the
equitable rules relating to reversing transfers caused by mistake are set out
in Part III. One of the signal achievements of R3RUE, then, is an attempt
to more effectively integrate common law and equitable doctrine. Thus,
continuing the illustration, all the rules dealing with mistaken transfers, be
they common law or equitable in origin are brought together in the section
on “Benefits Conferred By Mistake” in R3RUE. Further, the attempt at
integration is visible throughout the two volumes of R3RUE in Part II
setting out the liability rules, Part III setting out the remedies and Part IV
providing an account of the defences to restitution claims, including, in
each part, the black-letter rules arising from both common law and equity.
4. Substantive Grounds: the Liability Rules
The black-letter rules setting out the substantive grounds for imposing
restitutionary liability on a defendant are many in number and somewhat
complex, both in the United States and in other common law jurisdictions,
including Canada. Accordingly, it is no surprise that the majority of the
sections of R3RUE – sections 5 to 48 of a total of 70 – are devoted to a
restatement of these rules. These rules set out, in effect, the reasons why a
plaintiff may be entitled to restitution as where the benefit has been
conferred by mistake, under duress, in an emergency, and so on. These
28

This black-letter rule can be traced back at least as far as Keech v Sandford
(1726), Sel Cas T King 61, 25 ER 223. And see Maddaugh and McCamus, supra note 17
at 27-36 to 27-37.
29
[1997] 2 SCR 217, 146 DLR (4th) 214. As Andrew Kull, the Reporter for
R3RUE noted, “The problem in Soulos…[is that] the judges failed to see that a
fiduciary’s misappropriation of an opportunity is one of the classic examples of unjust
enrichment (usually remedied by a constructive trust) – without regard to how the venture
turns out in the defendant’s hands;” see Andrew Kull, “Deconstructing the Constructive
Trust” (2004) 40 Can Bus LJ 358 at 359-60.

450

THE CANADIAN BAR REVIEW

[Vol. 90

rules of existing law were referred to by Birks30 as the “unjust factors” and
have been referred to on occasion by the Supreme Court of Canada31 as the
“existing categories” of restitutionary claims.
Some Canadian readers will be interested to know the relationship
between the existing liability rules set out in sections 5 to 48 and the
general principle set out in section 1. R3RUE takes the view that section 1
may provide a basis for a type of claim that falls outside the existing
liability rules. In other words, the general principle provides a basis for
modifying or extending the law in new directions not covered by the
existing liability rules. In my view, this approach is quite consistent with
the Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence that states, with respect to the
role of the general principle that “[b]y retaining the existing categories,
while recognizing other claims that fall within the principles underlying
unjust enrichment, the law is able ‘to develop in a flexible way as required
to meet changing perceptions of justice.’”32 R3RUE refused to be drawn
into academic debates concerning the precise status of the principle and its
relationship with the existing liability rules. Having stated that virtually all
of the existing rules could be considered to be applications of section 1, the
Commentary to that section then observes as follows:
It is by no means obvious … how “unjust enrichment” should best be defined;
whether it constitutes a rule of decision, a unifying theme or something in between;
or what role the principle would ideally play in our legal system. Such questions
preoccupy much academic writing on this subject. This Restatement has been written
on the assumption that the law of restitution and unjust enrichment can be usefully
described without answering any of them.33

At a practical level, it is apparent that the underlying premise of R3RUE is
that “unjust enrichment” as a concept is so flexible and vague that it cannot
“yield a reliable indication of the nature and scope of liability imposed”34
by restitutionary doctrine. Hence the need for more specific rules. At the
same time the general principle can serve as a basis for modifying and
extending the existing law.

30

Peter BH Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1989) at 99 et seq [Birks, An Introduction].
31
See e.g. Peel (Regional Municipality) v Canada, [1992] 3 SCR 762 at 784, 98
DLR (4th) 140 [Peel]; Kerr v Baranow, 2011 SCC 10 at para 31, [2011] 1 SCR 269, 328
DLR (4th) 577 [Kerr].
32
Kerr, ibid at para 32 [emphasis added], quoting McLachlin J in Peel, ibid at
788-89.
33
R3RUE, supra note 1, vol 1 at 4.
34
Ibid.
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A major achievement of R3RUE is to group the black-letter rules
relating to the unjust factors under a series of headings that should be
readily recognizable to members of the profession thereby making a large
body of substantive doctrine readily accessible to them. The liability rules
are subdivided into five chapters; Chapter 2 (“Transfers Subject to
Avoidance”), Chapter 3 (“Unrequested Intervention”), Chapter 4
(“Restitution and Contract”), Chapter 5 (“Restitution for Wrongs”) and
Chapter 6 (“Benefits Conferred by a Third Person”). A summary list of the
contents of each chapter will give an impression, at least, of the broad
scope of the substantive law covered.
Chapter 2 (“Transfers Subject to Avoidance”) includes as sub-topics,
“Benefits Conferred by Mistake,” “Defective Consent or Authority”
(including fraud, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, incapacity
and lack of authority) and “Transfers Under Legal Compulsion” (including
payment under judgments subsequently reversed and recovery of tax
payments).
Chapter 3 (“Unrequested Intervention”) includes as sub-topics
“Emergency Intervention,” “Performance Rendered to a Third Person”
(including indemnity and contribution, equitable subrogation and
uncompensated performance under a contract with a third person), and
“Self-Interested Intervention” (including benefits conferred in the context
of divided ownership of property or under an expectation of ownership
rights, by unmarried co-habitants upon separation of their relationship and
“common fund” cases). Chapter 4, “Restitution and Contract” includes two
sub-topics. The first is “Restitution to a Performing Party with No Claim
on the Contract” (including benefits conferred under agreements that fail
for indefiniteness, informality, illegality, incapacity of recipient, on the
basis of mistake or frustration, under compulsion and finally, restitutionary
remedies of the party in default). Topic two, “Alternative Remedies for
Breach of an Enforceable Contract” includes rescission for breach,
restitution of benefits conferred by the party not in breach and claims for
the profits secured through opportunistic breach.
Chapter 5, “Restitution for Wrongs” includes as the first sub-topic,
“Benefits Acquired by Tort or Other Breach of Duty” (including trespass,
conversion and comparable wrongs, misappropriation of financial assets,
interference with an intellectual property and similar rights, breach of
fiduciary duty or duties of confidence and a basket rule relating to
“interference with other protected interests”). The second sub-topic covers
the law relating to “Diversion of Property Rights at Death” (including the
Slayer Rule and wrongful interference with donative transfers). Finally,
Chapter 6 deals with an interesting topic to which we will return, “Benefits
Conferred by a Third Person.”
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Broadly speaking, then, R3RUE covers much the same ground as the
1937 Restatement. The Reporter did not hesitate, however, to clarify wellestablished doctrines in light of more modern developments and, indeed,
to add sections dealing with such topics as property division between cohabitants and three-party cases which were barely touched upon in the
1937 Restatement. For Canadian readers, it will be of interest that the new
Restatement rule concerning property division between co-habitants is
remarkably similar to the rule recently articulated by the Supreme Court of
Canada in the leading case of Kerr v Baranow.35
Extended comment on any of the substantive rules restated in these
chapters of R3RUE obviously cannot be attempted here. Hopefully, it will
suffice to identify two attractive features of the R3RUE treatment of these
topics. First – and for this all credit goes to the Reporter, Andrew Kull –
the various sections restating the substantive rules are models of elegance
and clarity. The Reporter has a remarkable capacity for analysis and
synthesis of large and complex bodies of doctrine and an ability to restate
the fundamentals of the rules thereby developed in concise and accessible
propositional form. Two examples may usefully illustrate this feature of
R3RUE.
The rules relating to the recovery of moneys mistakenly paid to the
defendant by the plaintiff are, when compared to other aspects of
restitutionary law, relatively straightforward in their content. The rules
relating to the recovery of non-monetary benefits conferred by mistake are,
however, quite another matter. They consist of a welter of rules dealing
with various types of benefits that are consistent, to varying degrees, with
the unjust enrichment principle. R3RUE provides a generalized blackletter rule to cover all such cases in the following terms in section 9:
9
Benefits Other Than Money
A person who confers on another, by mistake, a benefit other than money has a claim
in restitution as necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of the recipient. Such a
transaction ordinarily results in the unjust enrichment of the recipient only to the
extent that:
(a) specific restitution is feasible;
(b) the benefit is subsequently realized in money or its equivalent;
(c) the recipient has revealed a willingness to pay for the benefit; or
(d) the recipient has been spared an otherwise necessary expense.36

35
Supra note 31, for discussion of which see Maddaugh and McCamus, supra
note 17, c 34.
36
R3RUE, supra note 1, vol 1 at 98-99.
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The difficulty confronted, not always successfully, in the existing law in
this area is that, for obvious reasons, the law is reluctant to impose liability
for a non-monetary benefit where the benefit in question was neither
requested nor wanted by its recipient. The defendant ought not be forced
to invest assets, in effect, in a benefit that he or she would not freely have
chosen. On the other hand, the authorities tend to grant recovery in
circumstances, broadly speaking, where the problem of forced investment
is not truly present.
Section 9 picks up on those signals in the case law and restates a rule
that coherently and simply captures the real reasons for granting recovery
in such cases. Thus, the problem of forced investment is not present where
specific restitution is feasible, where the benefit has been realized in
monetary value through, for example, sale of a mistakenly improved asset,
where the recipient has already indicated a desire to acquire and pay for the
benefit in question or the benefit constitutes an otherwise necessary
expense. The rule is consistent with the results in many decided cases,37
though not necessarily with the reasoning in such cases. Section 9 offers
an elegant and clear rule that offers a key to unlocking these difficulties
and allowing recovery in the context of non-monetary benefits which
precisely parallels the policies underlying the rule allowing recovery of
mistaken payments. Section 9 is an exquisite exercise in restatement. In my
view, Canadian courts could do no better than to simply adopt it as an
accurate expression of Canadian common law on this point.
The existing Anglo-Canadian law relating to the recovery of benefits
conferred under illegal contracts is also rather complex and unsatisfactory.
The principal barrier to a modernization of these rules is the traditional
policy of the common law that a party to an illegal agreement who is a
party to the criminality or illegality should never be allowed to recover in
a restitution claim for benefits conferred on the other party. Such a rule can
plainly be too harsh in cases where the plaintiff has contravened a
prohibition unintentionally or the illegality and/or its consequences are not
particularly grave. As a result, Anglo-Canadian doctrine on this point has
developed an impressively complex array of diversionary routes around
the traditional principle which have the effect of allowing restitutionary
recovery of some kind to a guilty party. American law has a similar history
but, in the modern era, has made a more direct assault on the problem and
recognizes more openly the potential claims of a guilty party.

37
See e.g. Greenwood v Bennett, [1973] QB 195 (CA); and see Maddaugh and
McCamus, supra note 17, c 12.
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Section 32 restates this rather complex body of common law doctrine
in the following fashion:
32 Illegality
A person who renders performance under an agreement that is illegal or otherwise
unenforceable for reasons of public policy may obtain restitution from the recipient in
accordance with the following rules:
(1) Restitution will be allowed, whether or not necessary to prevent unjust
enrichment, if restitution is required by the policy of the underlying prohibition.
(2) Restitution will also be allowed, as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, if the
allowance of restitution will not defeat or frustrate the policy of the underlying
prohibition. There is no unjust enrichment if the claimant receives the
counterperformance specified by the parties’ unenforceable agreement.
(3) Restitution will be denied, notwithstanding the enrichment of the defendant at
the claimant’s expense, if a claim under subsection (2) is foreclosed by the claimant’s
inequitable conduct (§ 63).38

In three simple propositions, section 32 states the substance and the
underlying rationales for what might otherwise seem a bewildering body
of jurisprudence. Subsection (1) makes it clear that where the claimant
who has conferred value is a party who is intended to be protected by the
policy underlying the prohibition, restitution will be granted. Much of the
existing Anglo-Canadian law on point rests on the foundation of this
proposition. Subsection (2) allows recovery to a party, whether a guilty
party or not, if the policy underlying the rule that renders the transaction
unenforceable will not be defeated or frustrated by the granting of
recovery. The most recent English, Canadian and Australian jurisprudence
can be seen to be consistent with this proposition.39 Finally, subsection (3)
states, in effect, that in circumstances where the plaintiff’s wrongdoing is
especially grievous in nature, relief will in any event be denied. This too is
consistent with the results of decided cases both in the United States and
in other common law jurisdictions. The important point for present
purposes, however, is that section 32 concisely and elegantly restates these
three propositions in such fashion as to communicate the rationale
underlying each of them in a manner that elegantly and accurately
summarizes the thrust of modern restitutionary law on this complex issue.
Again, Canadian courts could do no better than to align Canadian law on
this point with this section. These illustrations of the excellence of the

38
39

R3RUE, supra note 1, vol 1 at 505-506.
See Maddaugh and McCamus, supra note 17 at 15-29 to 15-41.
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drafting of the substantive liability rules in R3RUE could easily be
multiplied.
Finally, the thorough research underlying R3RUE and the capacity of
the Reporter to capture the essence of case law not previously restated, can
find no better illustration, in my view, than section 48 dealing with
“Payment to Defendant to Which Claimant Has a Better Right.” A
Canadian example nicely illustrates the problem addressed by this section.
In James More & Sons Ltd v University of Ottawa,40 the plaintiff builder
had undertaken a project for the defendant university under an agreement
that required the builder to pay taxes on building materials exigible at the
time of contracting and, further, with respect to any changes in the
applicable taxes, to absorb the cost of any increases but allow the benefit
of any decreases to the defendant university. In the unusual circumstances
of this case, the federal and provincial governments traded tax points with
respect to such taxes with the result that there was a 3 per cent increase in
federal tax and a withdrawal of a corresponding 3 per cent provincial tax.
Application of the contract to these facts resulted in the defendant
university enjoying a decrease in the contract price to reflect the lower tax,
notwithstanding the fact that the total tax burden on the builder remained
constant. Subsequently, it was determined that the new federal taxes were
refundable to various institutions, including universities. In effect, the
building contractor continued to absorb the full cost of the taxes even
though the university had received credit for them twice, once by reduction
in the contract price and secondly by the rebate from the taxing
government. Morden J held that the university had been unjustly enriched
by the refund and that it ought to be credited to the plaintiff.
The result in James More has always seemed sensible to me, but I
confess that I have never had a clear view as to how one should explain
this result. The claim does not fit easily within any of the existing
categories of liability nor is it easy to generalize a principle emerging from
such unusual facts. The case seemed sui generis to me as I could find no
similar authorities elsewhere in the Commonwealth jurisprudence.
Compare section 48 of the R3RUE which provides as follows:
48 Payment to Defendant to Which Claimant Has a Better Right
If a third person makes a payment to the defendant to which (as between claimant and
defendant) the claimant has a better legal or equitable right, the claimant is entitled to
restitution from the defendant as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.41

40
41

(1974), 5 OR (2d) 162, 49 DLR (3d) 666 (H Ct J) [James More].
R3RUE, supra note 1, vol 2 at 144.
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In the commentary following section 48, the Reporter gathers together
many cases drawn from American jurisprudence, including one which is
quite similar to James More42 in which relief is granted for reasons of this
kind. The precise explanation given in the Commentary for relief in this
particular sub-category of cases is that the “claimant has furnished the
value for which the defendant is compensated or reimbursed.”43 Surely,
this is precisely the problem in the James More case. Section 48 leads us
directly to the rationale for the granting of relief. Detailed study of R3RUE
has, for me at least, produced many similarly “eye-popping” moments.
5. Remedies
Part 3 of the Restatement draws together all of the rules relating to the
plethora of remedies (and names for them) available in the context of
restitution claims. Restitutionary remedies, as a subject, is rather complex.
Much of the terminology is arcane. One important source of complexity
arises from the structural feature described above – that restitutionary relief
is available, depending on the circumstances, in either one of two measures
of relief: recovery of the value of benefits transferred from plaintiff to
defendant; or disgorgement of profits secured by wrongful conduct. A
further complexity arises from the fact that restitutionary remedies may be
either personal or proprietary in their effect. The latter is normally the case,
for example, with the constructive trust. What one might hope for from a
modern restatement of these rules, accordingly, would be some
simplification in the terminology used to describe the personal and
proprietary remedies in each measure and further, a clearer sense than
emerges from the earlier case law of when it is appropriate to grant
proprietary rather than merely personal relief. R3RUE does not disappoint
in either respect.
The two sub-topics of this Part are structured around the distinction
between personal and proprietary relief. The first sub-topic deals with
restitution in the form of a money judgment and sets out the rules relating
to the calculation of restitutionary relief in either measure, where the
resulting award is to be an in personam obligation to pay a monetary
award. In terms of simplification, the archaic language of money had and
received – quantum meruit, quantum valebat and so on – cannot be found.
For those who hope that this arcane terminology may ultimately disappear
from the face of restitution law, these sections of R3RUE show the way.

42
Wayne County Produce Co v Duffy-Mott Co (1927), 244 NY 351, 155 NE 669
per Cardozo J.
43
R3RUE, supra note 1, vol 2 at 148.
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The second remedial sub-topic on proprietary remedies provides
accounts of the black-letter rules relating to rescission, constructive trust,
equitable lien, subrogation and the tracing rules that permit tracing
property into its product or tracing into or through a commingled fund. The
discussion of each remedy in R3RUE is illuminating. The principal insight
concerning the appropriate scope for proprietary relief is that one should
distinguish between situations where the plaintiff is seeking proprietary
relief in a “two-party contest” as opposed to a “three-party contest.” For
R3RUE, a two-party contest is one where the claimant is seeking restitution
against a solvent defendant. A three-party contest is one in which “the
defendant’s assets are insufficient to satisfy the defendant’s obligations
both to the claimant and to the defendant’s general creditors.”44 In a twoparty contest, the awarding of proprietary relief “is a flexible means of
achieving specific relief in restitution, justified by remedial economy and
convenience to the claimant.”45 In such a case, “specific restitution will be
more attractive than a money judgment when the property in question has
special value for the claimant; when it has appreciated in value; when its
value might be difficult to establish; or when recovery of the specific thing
is merely less costly than proof and recovery of its value.”46 In all such
cases, the claimant must be able to identify the asset constituting the target
of relief. Of interest to Canadian readers is the fact that the guidelines
provided by R3RUE with respect to the availability of proprietary relief in
two-party contests are remarkably similar to those guidelines offered by La
Forest J in the famous case of International Corona Resources Ltd v Lac
Minerals Ltd.47
In a three-party case, on the other hand, the contest is in effect a contest
for priority upon the defendant’s insolvency as between the plaintiff and
the defendant’s general creditors. In a three-party case, the question
becomes whether the claimant deserves priority over the general creditors
of the immediate party and here R3RUE holds that proprietary relief
should be more sparingly available. At the risk of over-simplification,
R3RUE does not grant priority over the interests of third parties who are
bona fide purchasers or payees of the target property48 and, even where
priority is available against third parties, it may be restricted in certain
circumstances to the amount of the claimant’s loss, in order to protect the
interests of the initial recipient’s creditors or a deceased recipient’s
dependents.49
44
45
46
47
48
49

Ibid at 298-99.
Ibid at 299.
Ibid.
[1989] 2 SCR 574 at 675-79, 61 DLR (4th) 14.
R3RUE, supra note 1, vol 2, s 60 at 439.
Ibid, s 61 at 468-69.
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6. Defences
Part IV of R3RUE is devoted to an extended treatment of the various
defences available in restitution claims and predictably, detailed treatment
is provided of defences of change of position, bona fide purchaser and
passing on. Section 6750 sets forth a defence of “Bona Fide Payee” which
is, in effect, analogous to the protection afforded by the bona fide
purchaser defence that is afforded to a purchaser of property other than
money for value and without notice.
In circumstances where either the Bona Fide Purchaser or Bona Fide
Payee defence is applicable, the success of the defence does not rest on
establishing a detrimental change of position on the part of the defendant
recipient. As the Commentary to both defences indicates, however, in
cases where the transfer of value to the recipient results from fraud or
mistake, and where the recipient is unable to demonstrate a change of
position, a minority of states withhold these defences. A simple illustration
of the minority view would arise in a case where A, being indebted to bank
B, mistakenly makes a payment to B intending the payment to actually go
to C. The minority view would allow A to recover the mistaken payment
from B. A defence of change of position would be available, however, if B
had relied on the payment by releasing security it held to secure the
repayment of A’s loan.
Rounding out the list of defences covered in Part IV, there is an
illuminating discussion of the principles of limitation of actions and laches
and two innovations in R3RUE, a defence of “Recipient Not Unjustly
Enriched”51 and a defence of “Equitable Disqualification” or “Unclean
Hands.”52 The former defence may appear redundant as the burden in a
restitution claim is on the plaintiff to establish an unjust enrichment. The
“No Unjust Enrichment” defence, however, is designed to state the
principle applicable in unusual cases in which, for example, a claim to
recover a mistaken payment is made out, but when the payment is viewed
in the larger transactional context or relationship between the parties, the
enrichment does not appear to be unjust. Consider, for example, one who
mistakenly pays a statute-barred debt, not realizing that there is no longer
a legal obligation to make the payment. This may appear to meet the
requirements of the mistaken payment rule but, given the existence of the

50
51
52

Ibid at 558.
Ibid at 481.
Ibid at 487.
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valid but now unenforceable debt, the retention of the payment is arguably
not unjust.53
The defence of clean hands set out in section 62 draws on familiar
notions of equity, of course, but as well from the notion, traceable at least
back to Moses 54 that in a quasi-contractual claim, the defendant ought to
be able to raise any equitable defence. An illustration of the application of
the doctrine to a common law quasi-contract claim could arise in the
context of a mistaken payment. Imagine, for example, that a mistaken
payment is made for a corrupt purpose. Although the mistaken payment
would normally be recoverable, the corrupt purpose may disqualify the
payer from relief.55 One risk with a defence of this kind, however, is that
it might undo the important notion, referred to above, that the fact that a
claimant is a party to an illegal contract should not in itself constitute an
automatic bar to relief. This issue is discussed in the Commentary to
section 63 at some length and the point is clearly made that the principal
determination to be made with respect to a claim for benefits transferred
under an illegal contact is whether the appropriate sanctions for violation
of the prohibition should include “forfeiture of what would otherwise be the
claimant’s entitlement to restitution.”56 Where, as a general proposition,
recovery would not be precluded, “[t]he relative culpability of the claimant
and the recipient in the transaction between them will sometimes, but not
always, be taken into account.”57 It appears to be intended, then, that the
gravity of the misconduct of the claimant may preclude recovery even in
the case where no general disqualification exists.
Canadian readers may be particularly interested to see that the passing
on defence continues to persist in American law and is restated in R3RUE.
In the Air Canada v British Columbia case58 La Forest J, inspired by
American jurisprudence recognizing such a defence, had suggested in
obiter that the defence might be applied to deny recovery against the
Crown to a payer of an unlawful tax who has been able to shift the burden
of the tax to a third party by, for example, simply raising the prices charged
to third party customers. The passing on defence has been subjected to
sharp criticism both in commonwealth jurisprudence and in the academic
53

For criticism of this result and the defence more generally, see Adam Rigoni,
“A Sin of Admission: Why Section 62 Should Have Been Omitted from the Restatement
(Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment” (2011) 68 Wash & Lee L Rev 1203.
54
Supra note 16.
55
For an illustration, see R3RUE, supra note 1, vol 2, Illustration 10 at 493-94.
56
Ibid at 489.
57
Ibid.
58
[1989] SCR 1161 at 1202, 59 DLR (4th) 161. See generally Michael Rush, The
Defence of Passing On (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006).
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literature on several grounds. First, it is difficult to reconcile the defence
with the basic restitutionary principle that a mistaken payment should be
recoverable and the fact that, as a general proposition, the law of restitution
ignores whether or not a mistaken payer may have been able to recoup his
loss in some way in dealings with third parties. As between the payer and
the payee, the payment ought to be recoverable and it is not obvious that
the Crown requires a special defence of this kind. Second, the defence is
often criticized on economic grounds on the basis that it is difficult to
determine with any degree of certainty who will bear the ultimate burden
of a tax and accordingly, it is difficult to determine with precision whether
or not the burden of the tax payment has truly been passed on. For reasons
such as these, the defence has been flatly rejected in Australia.59
In Kingstreet Investments Ltd v New Brunswick (Department of
Finance),60 the Supreme Court of Canada abolished the defence for
purposes of Canadian restitutionary law. In Kingstreet, the Court noted that
the initial experience of Canadian courts with the defence indicated
considerable difficulty in applying the defence in a consistent fashion.61
True to its task of restatement rather than reform, R3RUE nonetheless
restates the defence in section 64. The Commentary to that section,
however, goes on to indicate the theoretically problematic nature of the
defence and indicates that it is difficult to apply. Further, section 64 tries to
restrict the availability of the defence to clear cases of passing on by
limiting its scope to situations in which the clarity of the fact that the
burden of the payment has been passed on to the taxpayer’s customers, for
example, is such that the monies, if returned by the payee to the payer,
would plainly be recoverable from the payer, in a restitution claim by the
customers. Whether this approach will significantly reduce the application
of the defence in American law remains to be seen.
7. Terminological Issues and the New Title
Perhaps the most striking change from the 1937 Restatement to R3RUE is
the change in title from “Restatement of Restitution” to “Restatement of
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment.” This is a change that requires an
explanation and it does indeed receive one in the Commentary to section 1
of R3RUE.

59

Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Ltd, [2001] HCA 68, 208 CLR
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2007 SCC 1, [2007] 1 SCR 3 [Kingstreet].
Ibid at 31.
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The Commentary notes that use of the term “restitution” to refer to a
liability based on unjust enrichment “has frequently proved confusing.”62
The Commentary goes on to explain the adoption of the term “restitution”
as the title for the 1937 Restatement of the following terms:
The former Restatement of Restitution (1937) adopted the name “restitution” for this
topic because recognition of unjust enrichment leads, in most instances, either to the
avoidance of a transfer or to an obligation on the part of the transferee for what has
been transferred. Either remedy results in a form of “restitution” to the transferor. And
yet the concepts of unjust enrichment and restitution (in the literal meaning of
“restoration”) correlate only imperfectly.63

As the Commentary further explains, there are instances of liability,
notably disgorgement of profits and other value acquired by wrongful
conduct, which do not involve the restoration of something the claimant
previously owned. Moreover, there are instances of restoration, such as
rescission for misrepresentation, where, if the misrepresentee paid market
value for the value transferred, no unjust enrichment has occurred. In the
result, however, most of the “law of restitution” might more helpfully be
referred to as the law of “unjust enrichment.” At the same time, the
Commentary notes, the term “restitution,” no doubt as a result of the
influence of the 1937 Restatement, is the term “most commonly employed
throughout the common law world to refer to this set of legal obligations
and their associated remedies, some but not all of which involve a literal
restitution in the sense of restoration or giving back.”64 The new
restatement includes both “restitution” and “unjust enrichment” in its title
“not to imply that they are correlatives, much less synonyms, but to convey
as clearly and immediately as possible an accurate idea of the overlapping
topics treated herein.”65 In other words, unjust enrichment as R3RUE uses
the term does not capture every instance of “restitution” and, on the other
hand, literal “restitution” cannot always be explained by a literal
interpretation of “unjust enrichment.” Using both terms seems intended,
therefore, to capture all of the types of liability described in R3RUE.
It appears that throughout this discussion the term “unjust enrichment”
is essentially being used by R3RUE to refer to the rules imposing liability
and that “restitution,” at least in its narrow sense, is used to refer to the
remedy available for unjust enrichment. Nonetheless, the Commentary
also clearly makes the point that the use of the term “restitution” to refer to
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Ibid.
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the substantive liability rules is not being abandoned. As the Commentary
observes:
When used in this restatement to refer to a theory of liability or a body of legal
doctrine, the terms “restitution” and “unjust enrichment” will generally be treated as
synonymous [but that when terms are being used in a more narrow sense, this] should
be clear from the context.66

For the American lawyer, then, it seems likely that this third branch of the
law will continue to be known as the law as the “law of restitution” though
it may well be that the change in title will lead to increased use of the
phrase “unjust enrichment,” to refer to the substantive rules imposing
restitutionary liability.
In essence, R3RUE simply continues to employ meanings for the
terms “unjust enrichment” and “restitution that became conventional in
America in the wake of the 1937 Restatement and, indeed, in due course
throughout the common law world. This seems to me to be a wise choice
by Kull and the Institute. There is little to be gained in my view, and much
to be lost by adopting and attempting to promote novel definitions for these
basic terms. Not every observer will agree, however. In particular,
devotees of the later works of the late Peter Birks will no doubt be very
disappointed by R3RUE’s failure to incorporate his suggestions for a
dramatic restructuring of these basic concepts. Although Birks had
accepted as given and worked with the American terminology in his first
book on restitution,67 late in life he came to recant all of his previous
work68 including that (in my view) rather fine book, and proposed new
redefinitions of basic terminology and a new scheme for organizing at least
a part of the existing law of “restitution.” Beginning in 199869 and
culminating in his last work, Unjust Enrichment, 70 Birks proposed his

66

Ibid.
Birks, An Introduction, supra note 30.
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Birks, Unjust Enrichment, supra note 25 at xii (“Almost everything of mine
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Peter Birks, “Misnomer,” in William R Cornish et al, eds, Restitution, Past,
Present and Future (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1998) c 1. Andrew Burrows, a leading
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“Quadrating Restitution and Unjust Enrichment: A Matter of Principle?” (2000) Rest L
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own new definitions of “restitution” and “unjust enrichment” and insisted
that all English lawyers must adopt his new definitions for these terms.
Briefly stated, Birks’s new scheme was that “restitution” should be
defined as referring to “disgorgement” and that “disgorgement” in turn be
taken to refer both to the restoration of benefits transferred by the plaintiff
to the defendant and the giving up of profits and other benefits secured
from third parties. Restitution as thus defined could thus embrace both
forms of benefit based restitutionary liability. So far so good, one might
say, as this is pretty much consistent with American usage when used to
refer to the entire content of this third branch of the law. Birks went on to
insist, however, on two further definitional moves which substantially
depart from American usage.
First, Birks insisted that “restitution” could never be used to refer to
the substantive grounds for liability. That term must, in his view, refer only
to the remedy and not to the substantive liability rules giving rise to the
remedy of restitution. Second, he insisted that the term “unjust
enrichment” must be narrowly construed to refer only to cases of
enrichment by transfer of value from the plaintiff to the defendant such as
in a mistaken payment case. The law of unjust enrichment properly
understood, contained, in his view, only the core case of mistaken payment
and all cases strictly analogous thereto. The implication of this
pronouncement is that much of the “law of restitution” in the American
sense must no longer be considered to be grounded on the principle against
unjust enrichment. Birks’s new law of unjust enrichment, at the risk of
some over-simplification, thus includes only some but not all of the old law
of quasi contract with a bit of equitable rescission thrown into the mix.
Thus, much of the content of the 1937 Restatement (and R3RUE) does not
deal with “unjust enrichment” in his narrow sense.
It is part and parcel of Birks’s new view of the narrow scope of “unjust
enrichment” that the remedy of restitution, when available outside narrow
“unjust enrichment” is “parasitic” on other branches of the law. Liability in
narrow “unjust enrichment” rests on its own theory of liability and is thus
primary in some sense, whereas restitution for tort, for example, is
secondary liability, that is, merely a remedy for a liability established in
some other branch of the law, in this case tort. There are, in my view, a
number of difficulties with the parasitic theory. As Daniel Freidmann has
pointed out, it is not obvious that it captures accurately the history of tort
law.71 Further, it is not obvious how one should distinguish between
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See Daniel Friedmann, “Restitution of Benefits Obtained through the
Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong” (1980) 80 Col L Rev 504.
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primary and secondary sources of liability. More particularly, it is not at all
clear how such a distinction could apply to restitution for breach of
fiduciary duty where the law of substantive liability developed for the
explicit purpose of providing restitutionary forms of relief.72 From a
theoretical perspective, the parasitic theory dictates that the rules for
restitution must be a derivative of rules developed to provide
compensation. But why must the rules for restutionary relief be the same
as those for the different objective of compensation? The parasitic “theory”
rests on a simple assertion or ipse dixit to the effect that this must be so.
Further, since not all torts give rise to restitution nor do all breaches of
contract give rise to disgorgement, one might ask what is the natural home
for the rules determining which torts and which breaches of contract give
rise to these forms of restitutionary relief. One plausible answer, surely, is
that the law of restitution which gathers together all the rules for awarding
such relief might be that home. Fruitful analysis of the difficult question as
to when restitutionary liability for profitable torts ought to arise might best
be undertaken in the midst of an account of all the rules awarding such
relief for wrongful conduct of various kinds. Some evidence of and support
for this proposition might be the fact that the tort textbooks do not typically
address these questions whereas the restitution books do.
Be this as it may, it must be said that it almost never makes any
difference, in the real world, whether one considers restitutionary liability
in the context of contracts and wrongs to be parasitic or not. The only
situation that I am aware of in which an adherent of the parasitic theory
might favour a solution to a real world problem that might differ from
someone not afflicted by the parasitic theory arises in the context of waiver
of tort. Where the tort at issue is one which contains as one of its elements
the occurrence of an injury, as is the case with fraud for example, one must
consider whether in a case where an injury cannot be demonstrated, a
plaintiff targeted by the fraud might nonetheless be able to recover
restitution for the value of the ill-gotten gains. A parasitic theorist would
claim that such recovery is impossible because no tort has occurred. One
who believes that restitutionary liability is not subject to the parasitic
theory might take the view that just as is the case with the equitable fraud
of breach of fiduciary obligation, the commission of a common law fraud
might, at least in some circumstances, appropriately attract a restitutionary
form of relief, even in the absence of compensable loss being suffered by
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its target.73 Surely, the rational way to approach the analysis of this
question is to ask, not whether one adheres to the parasitic theory or not,
but, rather, whether the policies underlying disgorgement relief for breach
of fiduciary obligation in the absence of loss also support that form of relief
in the context of common law fraud. In short, the answer to a difficult
question of this kind, whatever it might be, should be pursued on the basis
of principle and underlying rationale rather than on the basis of an ipse
dixit theory of the parasitic nature of restitution outside Birks’s narrowly
conceived law of “unjust enrichment.”
Birks openly pressed his case for new definitions of “unjust
enrichment” and “restitution” to the American Law Institute in his “A
Letter to America: A New Restatement of Restitution.”74 Birks urged that
“restitution” should never be used to refer to the substantive law of
restitution. It must be used only to refer to the remedy. To use “restitution”
to refer to the substantive doctrine was to ignore the “nursery school
truth”75 that a series beginning with contract and tort cannot end with the
name of a remedy. The resulting misnomer of the 1937 Restatement had
“wrecked the Scott and Seavey project in the 1930s.”76 He asserted that
“we must not be indecisive in putting it right.” With respect to the remedy
of “restitution,” however, it should be defined broadly to include both
forms of gain-based recovery. He further urged the Institute that to adopt
his narrow definition of “unjust enrichment” to refer only to mistaken
payments and similar cases where benefits are transferred from plaintiff to
the defendant. Accordingly, he proposed that the new Restatement either
be narrowly restricted to cover only “unjust enrichment” in his sense and
to be so titled or if it was to extend to cover all of those subjects covered
within the 1937 Restatement, it should be considered to be a restatement of
“unjust enrichment and other causes of restitution” (such as contract, tort
and other wrongs, presumably) for which he proposed as a title
“Restatement (Third) of Restitution: Unjust Enrichment and Other
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Causes.” Andrew Kull’s proposed title of “Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment” was in his view unintelligible. It contained a “puzzle that is
formed into a riddle.”77 One might add, however, that the puzzle arises
only if one agrees to adopt Birks’s strict new definitions of these basic
terms. The Institute’s decision to persist with the conventional American
terminology obviously involves a rejection of these proposals.
8. Conclusion
The bold experiment of the 1937 Restatement of inventing a new third
branch of the law to stand alongside contract and tort has enjoyed
enormous success. The three paradigms of promise enforcement
(contract), compensation for injuries caused by wrongful conduct (tort)
and benefit-based liability in restitution have provided a conceptual
framework around which legal scholars (and the restatements themselves)
have been able to hang the details of the entire private law of obligations.
The three paradigms have also found a home in professional
consciousness. My impression, drawn from my interaction with many
members of the profession, is that litigators in particular quickly and
virtually instinctively identify benefit-based liability issues as separate
from contract and tort and that, by and large, they know how to go about
finding an answer to their problem. This may be surprising, given that so
few formal courses on restitution are given across the country with the
result that the vast majority of lawyers have not studied restitution in depth.
Nonetheless, I suspect that most law students are introduced to the basic
paradigm of unjust enrichment in their first year courses on contract law.
Across the common law world, there has been a flowering of scholarly
writing on restitution as legal scholars in the various common law
jurisdictions assimilated and drew upon the lessons of 1937 Restatement in
their own scholarly work.
It is true that R3RUE stands firmly on the foundation of the 1937
Restatement and the scholarly writing that it inspired. Nonetheless,
R3RUE is itself a stunning achievement, the credit for which is entirely
due to its author and Reporter, Andrew Kull. The Reporter’s prodigious
research, his mastery of this vast and complex body of law and his ability
to craft elegant and accessible principles aptly summarizing the blackletter of tangled strands of doctrine have produced a restatement that is not
merely a worthy successor to its 1937 ancestor but a very substantial leap
forward in our understanding of the law of restitution and the interaction
of its various components. From a Canadian perspective, and apart from
matters of detail, the law of restitution as restated in R3RUE is equivalent
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in its essentials to the Canadian common law in this field. For Canadian
lawyers, then, it is my view that R3RUE provides not only a useful
exposition of the fundamentals of the Canadian law of restitution but,
where it differs in detail, a fruitful set of suggestions for possible future
directions in Canadian law. We are all very much in Kull’s debt.

